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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 | 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 2x 73x 73x 73x 1x 1x 72x 73x 1x 1x 71x 71x 2x 2x 2x 47x 47x 47x 47x 47x 47x 47x 47x 47x 47x 47x 2x 2x 2x 30x 30x 30x 4x 4x 26x 26x 26x 26x 26x 26x 26x 26x 30x 3x 3x 30x | /**
* Symmetric encryption-at-rest for small secrets (print-service bearer tokens,
* webhook ring secrets). Server-only: uses node:crypto, keyed by SECRET_BOX_KEY.
*
* Sealed format (all segments base64url): `sb1:<iv>:<authTag>:<ciphertext>`
* AES-256-GCM — authenticated, so tampering or a wrong key fails loudly on open.
*
* Key management: SECRET_BOX_KEY must decode to exactly 32 bytes
* (`openssl rand -base64 32`). Rotating the key orphans everything sealed under
* the old one — for print connections the recovery is simply re-pairing.
*/
import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
const VERSION = 'sb1'
function loadKey(): Buffer {
const raw = process.env.SECRET_BOX_KEY
if (!raw) {
throw new Error('SECRET_BOX_KEY is not set — generate one with `openssl rand -base64 32`')
}
const key = Buffer.from(raw, 'base64')
if (key.length !== 32) {
throw new Error('SECRET_BOX_KEY must decode to exactly 32 bytes (`openssl rand -base64 32`)')
}
return key
}
/** Encrypt a UTF-8 string. Fresh random IV per call — sealing the same value twice yields different outputs. */
export function seal(plaintext: string): string {
const iv = randomBytes(12)
const cipher = createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', loadKey(), iv)
const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()])
const tag = cipher.getAuthTag()
return [
VERSION,
iv.toString('base64url'),
tag.toString('base64url'),
ciphertext.toString('base64url'),
].join(':')
}
/** Decrypt a sealed string. Throws on unknown format, wrong key, or tampered data — never returns garbage. */
export function open(sealed: string): string {
const segments = sealed.split(':')
// The ciphertext segment may be empty (GCM authenticates empty plaintext); iv and tag cannot.
if (segments.length !== 4 || segments[0] !== VERSION || !segments[1] || !segments[2]) {
throw new Error('secret-box: unrecognized sealed format')
}
const [, ivB64, tagB64, ctB64] = segments
const decipher = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', loadKey(), Buffer.from(ivB64, 'base64url'))
decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagB64, 'base64url'))
try {
return Buffer.concat([
decipher.update(Buffer.from(ctB64, 'base64url')),
decipher.final(),
]).toString('utf8')
} catch {
throw new Error('secret-box: decryption failed (wrong key or tampered data)')
}
}
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